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Antonius van den Hoogen
The relationship between economics and theology1
Introduction
Some theologians pay serious attention to economics. But they also have a 
serious problem how to speak about God, to speak in God's direction, as a 
former college of mine, Prof. P. Schoonenberg, used to say. And more and 
more theologians understand the burden which economics places on peo­
ple’s life and happiness. But in recent decennia most of them have also 
learned that there is a dividing line between the way one speaks about God, 
esp. on the part of Christians, and areas of social reality. The more the par­
ticular character of religious language is understood, the more also is under­
stood that religious language cannot be directly applied to aspects of every 
day life. In terms of the theology of liberation: theology is a secondary act, a 
reflection on the one hand over societal and psychological, cultural and eco­
nomic structures and events, and on the other hand about personal respon- 
sabilities, attitudes, behaviour and individual ways through which human 
existence is mystically deepened and broadened. Only in a contextually 
hermeneutical reflection is it possible to reach out to the Word of God as a 
word about life and destiny.
It is not only the way we understand the religious character of the manner in 
which we speak about God, esp. in our Christian traditions, which urges us 
to reflect anew on the relationship between economics2 and theology3. We
1 Translated from Dutch into English by Henry C. Hoeben.
2 ’Economics' is the scientific study of analysing and explaining the working and the 
constellation of the economic order. 'Economy' is the training in economic activities, 
in the proper approaches towards production and distribution, investment, savings 
etc. However, there exist also various definitions regarding the first meaning of the 
word (economics). In this article I use the definition as used by the economist H.W. 
Lambers from Rotterdam: The terrain of the economy is the organisation in society 
concerning the production and the distribution of goods and services'. Such a defini­
tion is connected with the type of reflection which is known under the term 'societal 
economy'. It means that in studying production and distribution of goods and services 
to the benefit of human necessities their relation with societal structures and relation­
ships is included.
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all live in societies which have defined the ends and goals of human life and 
the struggle for human dignity in more or less secular terms. We all do sub­
scribe to human rights, although there is a great difference in the way we 
define these rights. We all do subscribe to certain democratic aspects which 
are structurally part of economic relations, although we are well aware of 
the fact that nobody truly can formulate adequately the very content of de­
mocracy. In our societies we have solved such problems by means of politi­
cal affirmations regarding democratic behaviour.
In my opinion lies herein the very content of secularisation within our socie­
tal context. And thus secularisation forces theology to reformulate the man­
ner in which it speaks about God into religious traditions which are relevant 
for our lives and which are accepted in so far as their specific religious 
identity is concerned. As this kind of secularisation has a specific economic 
basis, theologians find it then very difficult and, yet all the same, very neces­
sary to redefine the relationship between economics and theology.
The central question in this contribution is a theological one, viz. whether 
within the context of the present economic order and all economic activities 
it is possible to find a "common ground", a proper way to speak about God. 
In classical terms it is a reference to the question whether the economic or­
der and all economic activities can really be a locus theologicus. In that 
sense it poses truly a major theological problem. And our purpose is there­
fore not to speak about economics from a theological perspective, or vice 
versa.
The question whether economic activities can be a locus theologicus is not 
only a difficult one, but at the same time an expedient one in view of the 
Scriptures. Both the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain a 
number of texts which refer to economic activities but in doing so really deal 
with God himself. A wellknown example is the parable of the wheat-farmer 
(Lk. 12,13-21). Texts like these have been frequently interpreted as parables 
which concern themselves with morally questionable activities and far less 
as parables which refer to the Kingdom of God, the impelling reality of God.
3 Theology can also be described as a way of ‘thinking towards God’(Schoonenberg). 
Thereby can be distinguished between a mystagogical and a scientific dimension. The 
mystagogical dimension tries to trace the reality of God as mystery. In the scientific 
dimension the purpose is to analyse about and reflect on talking about God, as taking 
place in specific contexts, with special interest for the interferences of 'talking about 
God' and the context, specifically with regard to economical aspects.
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It are such texts which from the start possibly open up new ways of reflect­
ing theologically on the relationship between economics and theology. And 
in efforts of this sort it is advisable to look for resemblances in the current 
debate about economics and ethics, in which theologians also participate. 
However, from such possible resemblances I will then try to bridge the gap 
between economics and theology from a different angle than the one of eth­
ics, which is generally pursued by most theologians.
1. Economics as a concern of moral philosophy
In his well-known book Religion and the rise of Capitalism 4 Tawney took 
on the question which traits were characteristic of the new problems that had 
emerged in the 16th century concerning both theology and economics. 
Tawney took usury as an example.
In the transition of a rural society to an open market economy new "actors" 
had emerged and consequently new demands for moral schemes appeared. 
At the very beginning "wage-earners" were still the minority. The farmer 
who was relatively independent, along with the tradesman and the small 
craftsman constituted the typical groups within society. All three groups 
were heavily involved in social conflicts which had to do with land-reform, 
as it was an economic reorganisation through a vast redistribution of land 
which brought with it that huge speculations about land were rife. Through­
out the Middle Ages it had been the normal way of thinking to pay heed to 
the principle that profits were equally shared. This principle was taken to be 
natural and based on a hierarchy of values, in which -  thus Tawney -  relig­
ion functioned as the "apex". Though theoretically these conceptions contin­
ued to be maintained for the greater period of the Reformation, in reality 
they were slowly being hollowed out as a new type of businessman 
emerged. They saw the way the market worked not as something that be­
longed to the "moral sphere" but rather as a sequence of causalities, which 
understandably operates "mechanically" as a clockwork does. In the medie­
val "theory" the natural law had been called upon to justify the curtailment 
of all economic self-interest. Now a new political theory emerged, ulti­
mately systematised by Locke, which held that the State had no business 
interfering in questions concerning proprietory rights and business practices. 
Thus the notion "nature" took on another connotation: the concept did not so
4 R.H. Tawney, Religion and the rise of Capitalism, London 1975 (11th ed.)
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much refer to the "divine order” as to the whole of ’’human wants” and 
"individual rights”.
Hand in hand with this basic shift in judging economic practices, so Tawney 
opines, went an increase in the number of lay-lawyers, who contested the 
Church's right to make laws for and apply them to (new) economic realities. 
’The prevalent religious thought might not unfairly be described as morality 
tempered by prudence and softened on occasion by a rather sentimental 
compassion for inferiors. It was the natural counterpart of a social philoso­
phy which repudiated teleology, and which substituted the analogy of a self­
regulating mechanism, moved by the weights and pulleys of economic mo­
tives, for the theory which had regarded society as an organism composed of 
different classes united by their common subordination to a spiritual pur­
pose’5 .
The developments, which Tawney thus described, anticipate according to 
him Adam Smith's subsequent conceptions of and theory about the ’invisible 
hand’ which reconciles personal interest with communal interest. It is often 
forgotten that this metaphor is not so much part of an economic theory but 
rather of a moral philosophy. According to Smith the advancement of per­
sonal interest was imbedded in norms, values and traditions. There emerged, 
thus Tawney in the text cited above, a moral philosophy which repudiated 
teleology.
The question however must be posed whether this contention is correct, at 
least in an ethical reflection on the economic order. The ethical theologian 
Gerrit Maneschijn comes to the conclusion in a recent article on this prob­
lem6 that ethics are again accepted in economics, though it is a conclusion 
he seems somehow to arrive at with sorrow. For, so he concludes, it is a 
kind of liberal ethics which is largely tailored to the needs of a liberal econ­
omy. And he distinguishes between an individualistic kind of liberal ethics 
and a social kind. The individualistic one takes the line that the market is 
morally neutral for it is a system based on "natural liberty” (Adam Smith). 
Within this kind then justice, which is circumscribed as a norm of activities 
directed towards cooperation and distribution, is taken as the concept of 
"mutual profit". On the other hand the social kind underscores that the prin­
5 Tawney, p. 194
6 G. Maneschijn,"Terugkeer van de ethiek in de economie? Enkele lijnen in een 
heropend debat", in: Tijdschrift voor Theologie 31(1991)nr.2, 140-162; 140.
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ciple of natural freedom wrongfully ignores the unequal points of departure 
between those who have rights, for the position of inequality depends to a 
large extent on birth and social status. Therefore within social ethics then the 
norm as standard for cooperation and distribution has to be determined by 
the principle of equality, which is to be understood as a reality-in-the- 
making in that the position of those who are worse off has to be improved. 
To advance such an amelioration demands the intervention by politics, not 
an intervention by the (market) economy, i.e. the amelioration is brought 
about by people who further the social kind of liberal ethics.
Do ethics return into economics? Maneschijn is sceptical. He is of the opin­
ion that the individualistic type of the liberal market economy hardly de­
serves the connotation "ethical". On the contrary, that type is really a dou­
bling of the very activities of the market economy. And in so far as one can 
speak about a social kind of liberal ethics, its place can only be secured ac­
cording to Maneschijn by political intervention. Yet in that instance he is not 
fully ready to accept that there is truly scope for ethics within economics. 
And that is the reason why Maneschijn is aggrieved by his own conclusion. 
He does not recognize therein an ethical attitude which can/wants to work 
from an intrinsic finality. Strictly speaking Maneschijn searches for rational­
ity within the economical system itself, whereby the rationality of ethical 
activities is being determined from within. This shows clearly another issue 
pointed out in his article.
From the very beginning Maneschijn clearly points out that as an ethical 
theologian he is mainly interested in focusing on the "ideological content" of 
the market economy: "the complexity of ideas, representations, values and 
norms at the level of thought"7. But at the same time he limits himself to 
elements thereof: the problems which arise in coordinating participative 
collaboration with distributive justice. Concrete examples of these issues 
are the current problems which are involved in determining the volume of 
labour-participation, or the problems concerning salaries when companies 
close down totally, but also questions which arise when capital is being 
transferred from poor countries to rich ones. The conclusion Maneschijn 
reaches, esp. that ethics is being allowed a very marginal place within the 
economy, is based on his analysis of some economic theories and the bear­
ing they have on the way trends of (economic) thought develop regarding
7 Ibid.
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these problems of coordination. "The approaches pursued by Sen and Apel 
show that it is hardly possible to internally solve the problems of coordina­
tion within the market economy. On my part I add: neither externally by 
authorities in using corrective powers. An intervention by the authorities is 
surely necessary, but not sufficient. A modem economic system is of ne­
cessity a politico-economic system.... Both politics and economics have to 
accept that ultimately the mistakes which are inherent in the system cannot 
be corrected by improving the system (though the improvement itself may be 
advantageous), but can only occur when the rationality of the system is inte­
grated within the rationality of ethical activities."8. As this has not yet hap­
pened so far, ethics has not gained a place within economics. Maneschijn 
agrees with Schokkaert and van Zuthem that it is disappointing to have to 
make deals (to have to make compromises) between justice and expediency 
so as to give ethics all the same some weight within economics. He does 
admit that rationality nowadays (e.g. within economics) is no longer intrin- 
secally linked to what is relevant and what is right. He subscribes to the 
view that modem economics has next to an instrumental feature 
(expediency) also its own feature of relevance (increasing chances of happi­
ness through economic expansion and technical progress). But Maneschijn 
obviously draws a line in accepting this type of instrumental rationality. As a 
theologian he defines this boundary with the term " a person's acceptance of 
God".
Why does Maneschijn draw the boundary with "a person's acceptance of 
God"? Indirectly he illustrates this by giving an interpretation of the classical 
two-kingdoms doctrine of Calvin, a "model" he favours. Calvin was obvi­
ously not abreast with the modem historical findings regarding human (i.e. 
economic) activities and had a very different type of economy in mind than 
the modem market economy, though the latter had started to develop around 
his time. Maneschijn's conception then postulates a historical mediation for 
Calvin’s doctrine. Yet in his opinion within these hermeneutical structures 
the two-kingdoms doctrine offers a solution for his problem: to possibly 
forge an intrinsic link between economics and theology. For within this 
model economics can be relegated in its own "kingdom" by theology. The­
ology can acknowledge that economics has its own rules and regulations, 
and thereafter theology has to concern itself solely with its own specificity,
8 Ibid., p. 149
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theology. Maneschijn argues that such a commitment originates in and is 
intrinsically willed by "a person's acceptance of God". "The very centre of 
the theology of the Reformation -  the doctrine of reconciliation -  sustains 
the conviction that God frees the perpetrator from his actions (consequently 
also from his functioning within society) and grants him back his total free­
dom. For that reason the distinction between the law and the gospel has to 
be uphelt. And that distinction underlies in turn the doctrine of the two king­
doms".
Must it then be conceded that Tawney is all the same right? Has the concep­
tual reflection about the destiny of humankind vanished from our moral phi­
losophies? If the views of a person like Maneschijn prevail, the conclusion 
does not seem valid. What has disappeared (at least in the philosophical 
conceptions which dominate in the West), is the hierarchical-participative 
model. Probably the last great representative, thus Tawney, was the 
"scholastic" Karl Marx who still based his analysis and perception of 
"surplus value" on the erroneous character of the "appetitus divitiarum infini- 
tus"9. However a person like Maneschijn, who has his roots in the calvinis- 
tic tradition, surely lets himself be guided by a view on a person's destiny. 
And that view takes on a central role in his analyses about the relationship 
between economics and theology.
2. ‘Economics’ and theology: a shared interest in teleology.
Maneschijn's analyses point to a teleology. And therein comes the problem 
to the front which in my estimation plays an important role in the relation­
ship between economics and theology: the question about the teleological 
model. Lateron I will touch on this problem in greater detail, but with a spe­
cial purpose in mind. But the question which I like to go deeper into in the 
next two sections is, whether it is conceivable to separate the teleological 
model from the (question concerning the) relationship between economics 
and theology? The reason is that the teleological model seems to impede any 
new and usefull exchange of ideas about such a relationship. In our secular­
ised society a number of different views, specifically in economics and the­
ology, about human destiny have come in vogue, which no longer can be 
held to be particular aspects of an overall view, which is based on metafysi- 
cal and religious concepts. Hence I will try to pose anew the very question
9 Tawney, p. 48
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about the relationship between economics and theology. Hopefully it proves 
to be more advantageous than to try to give a new response to the problems- 
at-hand from the perspective of existing and tested economical and theologi­
cal paradigms.
2.1 The institutional character of economic rationality 
Earlier we made already reference to a teleology which is virtually intrinsic 
to all economic activities, viz. the pursuance of happiness through economic 
growth and technical progress. Some are of the opinion that this need for 
growth derives from a situation of shortages and consequently is a natural 
factor. From such a perspective it is then possible to define economics as the 
science of shortages. And this represents the view of the so-called neo­
liberal approach. Here economics is understood as ‘the science which stud­
ies the human conduct as a relationship between targets and scarce, alterna­
tively available means'10. The rationality of economics is defined in this neo­
classical view from the perspective that decisions based on choice can be 
taken rationally even in situations of great shortages. The neo-classical 
opinion also holds that it is not economics' charge to make choices. Econom­
ics merely studies the relationship between targets and means. Within this 
perspective then the homo oeconomicus is somebody who 'acts egotistically’ 
(selfishly); who acts materialistically (in pursuance of material benefits), 
who acts 'maximizingly' (looking for accelerated gain), who acts 'archimedi- 
cally’ (all ’goods' and 'services’ are exchangeable in principle), who acts ’ob­
jectively’ (on the basis of accurate information regarding the relation be­
tween price and product c.q. consumption) and who acts 'parametrically' 
(surmising an unvarying situation)11.
Critics of this neo-liberal view are however of the opinion that this homo 
oeconomicus and his rationality do not exist. For people do not always base 
their decisions on these conditions, nor do these conditions exist the same all 
over. They hold that often people do base their actions on the rule of thumb 
and tradition, and even more do so on (well founded or not founded) expec­
tations of what others may do.
10 T. Vandevelde,"Economie als studie van de regels van de toeëigening", in: K. Boey, 
T. Vandevelde, T. van Gerwen (red), Een prijswaardige economie. Een ethische 
visie, Antwerpen 1993, p. 228
11 Ibid., pp. 230-231
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In the light of such criticism the search for a truly different approach has 
been started so as to be able to explain economic activities. And within this 
research the emphasis has been laid on the 'appropriation of signs of 
wealth'12. Such a search is based on the assumption that there is an 'institu­
tional character of the economic rationality’. Factually, any economic activ­
ity is intertwined with a number of institutions and structures which add a 
specific 'value' to the desire to covet such goods and services. And this cov- 
etessnous in turn determines to a great extent choices and decisions. Thus 
the markets are regulated in various diverse ways, and only a small part of 
that regulation has to do with intended interventions (e.g., the market of oil- 
products is very strong though the price of petrol is merely a fraction of the 
price to be paid at the service-station). It is always inherent in playing the 
market to accept a 'calculated risk, a dangerous leap', for each and every 
producer depends on the situation of finding a buyer who sufficiently 
"covets" his product.
This approach of the economic rationality also starts from the assumption 
that all human activity has a 'mimetic' character, so also economic activities. 
We covet goods and services for they are in the possession of others with 
whom we are in one way or another connected. And in coveting these goods 
we not only transpose to these persons a quality whereby the goods them­
selves become desirable, but we also view these persons as (possible) ob­
stacles to our desire to possess these goods and services. In order now to 
forestall a constant war of all against all and provide guidance into (proper?) 
channels, markets and institutions have been created, which institutionally 
give a qualification to this mimetic desire and regulate all possible violence. 
This approach also presumes that there is constant interaction between these 
institutions and the importance we attribute to specific services and goods, 
and that interaction then makes them for us (rightly so or not) desirable. But 
also that interaction is obviously subjected to continuous changes.
2.2 Economic rationality and basic choices: justice and tragedy 
The neo-classical approach of the economy takes it that it is not the task of 
the economist to determine the targets of economic activities. These targets 
are set by politics and only in this manner are ethics and economics brought 
into contact with each other. The economic rationality remains thus un­
touched by ethics (and -  as the case may be -  by religion). On the other
12 Ibid., pp. 227-246
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hand, relevant factors are transformed into 'normative' factors, although eco­
nomics which is deemed to be truly value-free should play no such part. 
From the perspective of an institutional approach there is the possibility to 
research into -  what I would call -  the factual 'constitution of justice'. Not 
all choices nor all effects which we desire are ethically acceptable. It should 
moreover be clear that within a concrete social situation it is not immedi­
ately possible to deduce from ethical principles the "just" kind of action. I 
use the expression ’constitution of justice’, for neither cognitively nor ethi­
cally is there a direct and unilateral connection between ’justice’ and the in­
stitutional framework in which economic activities are to be understood. To 
fill in this expression concretely I fall back on the notion ’entitlement’ as used 
by the economist Sen and on the notion ’basic structure’ of the moral phi­
losopher Rawls13.
Sen has pointed out that the economic problem of foodshortages (famines) is 
not primarily an issue of the quantity of food, which is being produced per 
capita of the population, but rather of the legitimate rights (entitlements) a 
person can claim as his part of society’s wealth. In many cases famine is less 
a problem of production but more so a problem of procurement. Rawls 
points out that each society possesses a basic structure which is the cumula­
tive effect of social and economic legislation. The notions ’entitlements’ and 
’basic structure’ do not only depict conditions, but are moreover regulative 
structures on which the right to covet certain goods and services can be 
justly based and which make it possible to critically evaluate the basis of 
this just right. E.g. a reflection about human rights thus takes place within 
economics.
It probably has become clear that within the institutional approach there is 
really room regarding basic choices in economic activities. The two types of 
research, that into these basic choices and that into the functioning of the 
economy, do not go hand in hand but neither are they totally unrelated. It is 
not only scarcity which causes desire; the reverse is (perhaps) more often 
the case, and the more so, it is said, because the desires are not (longer) re­
ligiously rooted. ’Goods and services are said to be economically scarce, not 
so much because there is a lack of supply, but rather because they are the 
stakes in a contest (competetive desires)’14.
13 Ibid., pp. 242-243
14 P. Tijmes,"De maatschappij in de slip", in: P. Tijmes (red.), Arbeid adelt niet, Kampen 
1989, p. 75
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So as to avoid a stalemate between on the one hand a deontological opinion 
about the relationship of ethics and economics and on the other a neo­
classical opinion, the notion has been frequently advanced that political de­
cisions and responsibilities should underlie economics. Maneschijn has ex­
plained why in his opinion this solution is falacious. I concur with him that 
such a politico-ethical solution is unsatisfactory. The politico-ethical solution 
does not gain greater weight if efforts are undertaken to bolster the ethical 
concern by means of a prophetic-eschatological belief in God. In the latter 
instance ethics are then often reduced to a form of theologising and that adds 
one more hindrance to an open discussion between theology and economics. 
It is my steadfast opinion that each way of constituting justice is inevitably 
tied to a dimension of tragedy. Tragedy is an intrinsec part of all economic 
activities and bound up with the question of justice. For within the context of 
the institutional approach each way of constituting justice implies a 'leap', a 
'risk'. Whether specific products and services are being coveted depends to a 
great extent on the comportment of others with whom we are connected and 
the latter's perception by third parties. Neither the quality of that informa­
tion, nor the trust we place in this quality are realities which can be accu­
rately quantified. This can easily be verified when we observe the changing 
relation between a product's price and its expected quality. If we were to go 
by the price as to be a decisive indicator of quality, this procedure itself 
would lead to purely speculative forms of logic, which in turn would induce 
even greater price-fluctuations. The institutional approach to economics 
holds that there is need for a group of institutions, which has the confidence 
of the economic actors and which is guarantor of both the quality of the ob­
jects to be traded and of the traders. The ‘entitlements’ and the 'basic struc­
tures' cannot exist without such institutions which make sure that economic 
instability is kept within limits. However, that does not mean that tragedy 
only occurs when the constitution of justice has failed. Tragedy is intrinsi­
cally tied up with such a constitution, as the alternative possibility thereof, 
which cannot be rationally excluded totally15. The discussion between an 
economist and a theologian is therefore not merely a discussion between a 
rationalist and a tragic poet, but rather a discussion about tragedy and ra­
tionality whereby the economist scrutinizes the rules regarding all the things
15 In using the terminology the 'arrangement of tragedy* I base myself on: A. J. Baart, 
Het arrangement van de tragiek, Utrecht/ 's Hertogenbosch 1993
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we deem covetous and whereby the theologian examines this reality as a 
possible paradigm to speak about God.
3. The 'homo oeconomicus1 in theology
In this section I will propose some ideas which affect economics as a field in 
which it is possible to speak about God. As I wrote above, I'll search for 
possibilities wherein the teleological model is not posed as an a priori as­
sumption. In the foregoing section this line of action was already pointed out 
as the connection, which exists between justice and tragedy, had been fea­
tured. In this section I propose to continue that line by posing the question 
whether and how economics can be understood as a field in which one can 
speak about God. First I will demonstrate by means of an example how this 
takes place in Sacred Scripture. Thereafter I will present two theological 
positions of theologians who have intensely studied the field of economics in 
so far as it touches on questions concerning God. Finally I will propose my 
own solution.
3.1 Economic risk as a parable
‘16... There was a rich man whose land yielded heavy crops. 17 He debated 
with himself: ’’What am I to do? I have not the space to store my produce. 
18. This is what I will do,” said he: ”1 will pull down my storehouses and 
build them bigger. I will collect in them all my com and other goods, 19 and 
then say to myself, ‘Man, you have plenty of things laid by, enough for 
many years: take life easy, eat, drink, and enjoy yourself.’” 20 But God said 
to him, ’’You fool, this very night you must surrender your life; you have 
made your money -  who will get it now?” (Lc. 12:16b-20)
Parables never display only one 'bright idea', never hold only one message. 
They serve the purpose to transpose and to shed light on certain connota­
tions, but they certainly do not present total transpancy. Even a caption as 
‘the rich fool’16 suggests that this parable touches on character traits, which 
could well be personified. However upon closer scrutiny doubt arises about 
such a suggestion. The text forms part of a more general setting which di­
rects a question to Jesus which concerns an issue of inheritance. Jesus' an­
swer contains a clear warning against all forms of avarice. Such a person
16 Cf. A commentary on the gospel according St. Luke (A.R.C. Leany), London 1966 
(2d ed.), p. 196
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will not fare well, Jesus remarks. And in a similar vein he concludes his re­
marks: collect no rich treasures for yourself instead of for God. Avarice -  
though easily recognized as a character trait -  takes here the place of a 
’negative' commonplace instead: of God. It is a reference which demon­
strates that reality is not only to be understood as ’to be of God', but also as 
something contrary: reality as 'not to be of God'. The parable seems fore­
most to relate to the question: how is it possible to discern whether a reality 
is ‘of God’ or whether on the contrary: ‘not of God’. The parable does not 
touch on character traits which could possibly be personified, but rather on 
the question how it is possible to discern ‘God’. There is further no intima­
tion about the question to what extent ethical comportment refers to God. 
The primary concern touches on the question whether the field at hand can 
be exchanged as reality with a reality 'of God’. That concern is not so much 
a moral question or a question of attitudes, but rather a question of funda­
mental theology. And it should be emphasized that very pointedly this ques­
tion of fundamental theology is examined in a problem of economics: viz. 
the question how people comport themselves in situations of great risks. The 
wheat-farmer wants to make sure that his (future) economic risks are as 
minimal as possible. God is portrayed as someone who wants to keep his 
economic risks as minimally as possible.
The question how economic risks can be reduced to a minimum is taken up 
in a story which deals however with another question: how is an inheritance 
to be divided? The question about sharing an inheritance is more often a 
hidden question about the true participants in the History of the Covenant 
and the correct interpretation of the Thora. This question greatly influenced 
the conflict between the Jewish community and the early Christian com­
munity, which had emanated from the former. It is consequently the question 
what meaning must be given to the word ’God’ in the light of the Jewish 
Thora and its practical and narrative History of Reception.
Thus a situation with complications has emerged: the question concerning 
the true participants in the History of the Covenant (the question concerning 
the true inheritors of the History of the Covenant) has basically become a 
question about the true, practical and narrative understanding of 'God'. The 
controversy, which meaning must be given to the word 'God', is brought into 
the open by means of the question what is the difference between 'sharing' 
and 'non-sharing’ (of an inheritance). It is not possible to circumscribe 'God' 
with 'non-sharing'. Is it possible to do so by ’sharing’? The parable and the
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storyteller leave the question wide open! But the parable depicts sublimely 
both the economic instability and the efforts of the wheat-farmer to minimize 
the consequences as much as possible in a model of action. In a pictorial 
sequence the wheat-farmer's success is colourfully portrayed: building store­
houses, collecting corn, eating, drinking, enjoying himself. And the story 
does not fail to stress the sense of well-being underlying the sequence. Was 
Abraham's wealth not a sign of God's blessing? But abruptly this agreeable 
sequence is 'ripped to pieces'. God calls the wheat-farmer a fool. Death 
which may overtake a person suddenly contrast glaringly with the success- 
full effort to ensure the future. The sequence of certitude is pitted against 
death, which is inevitable. Someone who acts economically does therefore 
not escape uncertainty.
It is not possible to circumscribe 'God' with ' non-sharing'. Why is this so? 
The storyteller, who questions whether he should interfere as a referee in a 
dispute about an inheritance, suggests that 'non-sharing' does not necessarily 
guarantee the continuation of one's existence. A claim will be inevitably 
made on a person's life. And what is he to offer in exchange? Of what can he 
be sure? It is my personal opinion that this parable should not be read as an 
exposé of qualifying or disqualifying qualities. It is not a parable which 
points to the precariousness of human existence nor one which offers the 
'moral' message that solely trust in God can help in the precariousness of 
human existence. Rather, it is a story about God and people, about God and 
reality. And a parable about the 'instability' of economics is presented in or­
der to address the question which words can express something about God. 
Or better yet, the 'instability' itself is presented as a parable. It is a parable 
which focuses on constituting tragedy in economic activities, to speak in 
terms of the preceding section.
3.2 Two theological positions: M.-D. Chenu and A.Th. van Leeuwen 
Who is the homo oeconomicus whose risky existence is explained paradoxi­
cally by means of a parable about God and his relation to reality? I consider 
this question surely as interesting as the questions which touch on the differ­
ences and similarities of contents regarding the views of these two theologi­
ans. I am far more interested in the questioning strategy which underlies 
both positions. In that connection the word paradox is of utmost importance. 
In the view of both theologians economics and theology are not directly, i.e. 
without mediation, linked with each other, but rather paradoxically.
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To Chenu17 this is apparent when the question is asked whether a Christian 
can be credibly present in the field of economic activities. He responds 
positively, however with two conditions. Firstly, a liberative praxis overa- 
gainst the poor and the struggle against poverty will be a gauge of this 
credibility. Secondly, the major criterion will be the messianic character the 
Christian tradition uses to speak about God. And these two postulates of 
credibility are linked with each other, in the light of Chenu’s view on the 
question regarding the sense of history. For ‘the sense of history’ is not 
merely a reality which is present and which 'only' has to be uncovered. No, 
the sense of history is ultimately a free reality which, promised as it is within 
messianic symbolism, will make its appearance in a reality in which the 
struggle against poverty and the liberation of the poor will direct all eco­
nomic activities and will determine their goals.
According to van Leeuwen18 the question is completely different. He lays 
great stress on the question whether a good ’citizen’ can truly be a good 
Christian? Hence the question posed by van Leeuwen is really a one hundred 
and eighty degrees turnabout with regard to the one posed by Chenu. It is a 
question which originates in a historically and economically induced setting 
and which searches for ‘the Christian’s liberty’ in a secularised context. Is it 
possible for a citizen, a person, who in our context paradoxically appears to 
be at the same time the architect as well as the product of an economic sys­
tem of free enterprise, to be someone who understands himself to be simul 
iustus et peccator? Also van Leeuwen thinks that his question can indeed be 
answered positively. However, a positive answer demands a critical analysis 
of the religious basis of this economic system and a critical disentanglement 
of the historically developed ideological connections which have links be­
tween this economic system, religious practices and the claim on truth on the 
part of Christianity.
Our analysis clearly shows that there are considerable differences in the 
strategies underlying the manner in which both Chenu and van Leeuwen
17 M.-D. Chenu,"Paradoxe de la pauvreté évangélique et construction du monde", in: 
M.-D. Chenu, La parole de Dieu,II L'évangile dans le temps, Paris 1964, pp. 389- 
404. Cf. also: T. van den Hoogen, Pastorale theologie. Ontwikkeling en structuur in 
de theologie van M.-D. Chenu, Alblasserdam 1983, particularly pp. 118-128
18 Cf. for the following: H.-D. van Hoogstraten, Zoeklichten in de nacht van het 
kapitaal. Een discussie over de economische theologie van A. Th. van Leeuwen, 
Voorburg 1987, pp. 9-17
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pose their questions. Even so both concur on one point. Both theologians 
attach great importance to the idea that history serves a purpose and that it is 
crucial for a (faithful) interpretation of history, i.e. of economic activities to 
accept that purpose as something which gives meaning to our economic ac­
tivities and to our history as a whole. In other words both theologians make 
use of a teleological view on history. Only thus are they able to forge a con­
nection between economics and theology.
Precisely at this point I want to pursue another trail, a road where much 
more attention can be given to the tragic dimension of economic activities as 
well as to the tragic dimension of history.
3.3 Economics as a story of life and death
Why is it necessary to fight poverty? People like Sen and Rawls try to rea­
son from the significance of ‘justice’. Their responses go like this: because it 
is more just to fight poverty than not to fight it, because the demands of the 
poor have also a bearing which can be defined economically: it are as many 
efforts to overcome the dilemma between ‘cynical bookkeepers’ and ‘fanatic 
prophets’ and to encourage a discussion between representatives of either 
side. Even so, the question is pertinent: why indeed is it necessary to fight 
poverty? Could it be that the answer should not be given from a position 
which on the one hand does not lie beyond the opposition of scientific ra­
tionalism, which borders on cynicism, and on the other of an assessment of 
values, which often leads to fanaticism, but rather from a position which 
takes into account the intrinsic limits of either ‘approach’? What does ante­
cede the disinterest of science which -  sometimes in a balanced manner but 
more often in one which shows that a balance has been forced -  promises 
freedom of the invisible hand but in reality sustains, and even more so pro­
motes, poverty and dependency? Yes, why indeed is it necessary to fight 
poverty?
It is my firm conviction that this question cannot be answered fully argu­
mentatively, neither from the perspective of economics nor from that of eth- 
ics19 . It is possible to analyse economics critically, as is done by van Leeu­
wen. And furthermore it is possible to present ethics plausible within the 
outline of a discourse on economics. But also such a discourse is necessarily 
preceded by another one, which sometimes is openly broached, sometimes
19 Here I have been following: A. Burms en H. De Dijn, De rationaliteit en haar 
grenzen. Kritieken deconstructie, Leuven/Maastricht 1986
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not, and the character of which is neither economical nor ethical. Ethics and 
economics do imply an argumentative effort to define liberty. Such efforts 
involve historically changing position between a disinterest which is sup­
posed to serve humanity and an inquisitive knowledge which pursues the 
same aim. But the diversified definitions of humanity and liberty point to a 
kind of particularity, for which there is no solution. Even an approach a la 
Kant does recognize the idea of maturity which is considered as regulative. 
And such particularity constitutes the intrinsic limit of each effort to argu­
mentatively define liberty (as the purpose of all economic activities).
The lesson which can be drawn from the afore-mentioned story about the 
fate of the wheat-farmer is in my opinion that the particularity, which is part 
of the definition of liberty, does not derive so much from the purpose of lib­
erty -  as the classical trends of morality used to stress -  but from the inevi­
tability of death. Each definition of liberty is per se particularized by death. 
That is its overwhelming tragedy. Each definition of liberty is a line of ac­
tion, which is economically more or less plausible, to the extent as it regu­
lates the desires, to postpone death. It is also posssible to turn this statement 
around. Each regulation and institutionalisation of our desires is already a 
confirmation of death. That is why it is possible from an institutional per­
spective of economic activities to interpret economics as a story about life 
and death.
Our institutional approach may come as a surprise, but perhaps an even 
greater surprise is the fact that I have used the term story. Is it possible to 
use that term in relation to economic activities? Walter Benjamin has made it 
clear that history, i.e. economic activities, can be addressed in a twofold 
manner. The first he calls ‘historism’. For him it expresses the continuity in 
time which depicts to the eyes of the (economical) victors the very mark of 
their victory. But this ‘historism’ (or: historical materialism) is surely very 
different from ‘history’20. In Benjamin's view then history is, different 
therefore from historism, not a projection towards progress in the future but 
rather a retrospective view which finds its origin in ‘the paradise’ in which 
we presently are. Within that retrospective view the notion time is not a ho­
mogenous and empty one, but rather denotes a series of catastrophes in the
20 "Die Tradition der Unterdrückten belehrt uns darüber, daß der ‘Ausnahmezustand’ in 
dem wir leben, die Regel ist. Wir müssen zu einem Begriff der Geschichte kommen, 
der dem entspricht”, W. Benjamin, "Über den Begriff der Geschichte", in: W. 
Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften 1,2, Suhrkamp Verlag, München 1974, p. 697.
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midst of which a flash of 'paradise' becomes visible, a moment which can be 
referred to as 'now'. The perception of this ‘now’ is caught in messianic 
imagary. And, so Benjamin, such images pertain to the languages of the op­
pressed.
Why is it necessary to fight poverty? If Benjamin’s trend of thought is pur­
sued, such a praxis does not serve a purpose which points forward. It is fit­
ting to fight poverty, a concretisation of ‘the exceptional situation which is 
the rule’, because in this way this empty homogenous time, this forward 
projection, is being broken open in expectancy of a messianic moment. By 
combatting poverty death is being pushed back. And the certainty of death, 
which is so significantly stressed in the narrative, looks forward to a univer­
sality and a universal fellowship, which is not to be detected with a timely 
concept forward, but which is a persuasive trait of both the jewish and 
Christian belief in God. In my opinion that is the reason why Holy Scripture 
contains so many stories about God which are factually stories about eco­
nomic activities. They are not so much stories with a philosophical view on 
economic matters, but rather stories which from a messianic perspective 
scrutinize our efforts to regulate all our desires so as to postpone death.
Antonius J.M. van den Hoogen 
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NIEDERLANDE
Zusammenfassung
Dem Autor geht es um die Verhältnisbestimmung von Ökonomie und 
Theologie. Seine Fragestellung lautet, ob die ökonomische Ordnung bzw. 
ökonomisches Handeln locus theologicus sein kann. Nach der Untersuchung 
früherer Entwürfe zum Einfluß wirtschaftlicher Systeme auf die theologische 
Reflexion stellt der Autor die Ideen einiger zeitgenössischer Denker vor. 
Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluß, daß das ökonomische Handeln ein genuiner 
locus theologicus sein kann. Die ökonomisch konnotierten Aussagen, die 
einige neutestamentliche Gleichnisse über Gott nahelegen, interpretiert er 
jedoch in einer messianischen Perspektive. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der 
Gerechtigkeit müssen sich Christinnen und Christen notwendigerweise für 
die Beseitigung von Armut engagieren. Dem Kampf gegen Armut wohnt ein
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messianisches Moment inné, da er als Mittel zur Gerechtigkeit gegen den 
Tod antritt.
Resumen
El autor aborda la cuestiôn de la relation entre economia y teologia. ^Puede 
ser el orden econômico un locus theologicusl Despues de examinar algunas 
concepciones histôricas del impacto de la economia en la teologia, el autor 
présenta las ideas de algunos de sus colegas actuales sobre este punto. Se 
deduce que la actividad econômica puede figurar como locus theologicus. 
Sin embargo las imagenes de Dios en ciertas parabolas de connotaciôn eco­
nômica revelan mas bien el carâcter mesiânico de las mismas. Pueste que se 
trata de una cuestiôn de justicia, los cristianos estan obligados a luchar con­
tra la pobreza. Esta lucha conoce también un momento mesiânico, pues, 
siendo asundo de justicia, es siempre una lucha contra la muerte.
Résumé
L'auteur aborde la question de la relation entre économie et théologie. L'orde 
économique, peut-il être un locus theologicus? Après avoir examiné quel­
ques conceptions historiques de l'impact de l'économie sur la théologie, 
l'auteur présente les idées de certains de ces collègues contemporains sur la 
question. Il en déduit que l'activité économique peut bel et bien figurer 
comme locus theologicus. Cependant les images de Dieu dans certains pa­
raboles de connotation économique révèlent plutôt du caractère messianique 
de ces paraboles. Puisqu'il s'agit d'une question de justice, les chrétiens sont 
obligés à lutter contre la pauvreté. Cette lutte connaît aussi un moment mes­
sianique, car dédiée à la justice, elle est toujours une lutte contre la mort.
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